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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In paragraph 21 of its Statement of the Case, plaintiff
and appellee Gro Enterprises, Inc. (Gro) asserts that no resoonse
was made to the Request for Production of Documents. However,
Delwin T. Pond, who was serving as attorney for the defendant and
appellant National Insurance Marketing Services, Inc. (NIMS),
affirmed in connection with that Request for Production of Documents
that a copy of a letter dated May 26, 1987 showing the items
returned by NIMS to Gro for a total credit of $11,050 had been
sent to NIMS1 attorney, Ms. Van Frank.

Record on Appeal (ROA) at

82, 84.
In addition, Mr. Pond had indicated that on May 29, 1991
he had sent to Gro's counsel a cooy of the Memorandum generated
by Gro relating to NIMSf claim that goods for credit were returned
to Gro.

ROA at 41.
The record on appeal does not include any Request for

Production of Documents.
The trial court had before it the Affidavit of Leslie
Van Frank dated June 27, 1992 containing the qeneral assertion that
"no answers to the outstanding discovery have been filed."
36.

ROA at

This Affidavit omitted any mention of the documents Mr. Pond

had already produced for her or that additional documents were due.
Thus the record does not substantiate the statement,
"No response was made to the Request for Production of Documents."
As a matter of fact and for the Court's information, as
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shown in Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents to
Defendant, a copy of which is attached hereto, the only documents
NIMS was requested to produce were those identified in its answers
to the Interrogatories.
As can be seen from NIMS1 Answers to Interrogatories,
no documents were identified therein.

ROA at 75-78.

Nevertheless,

NIMS oroduced documents supporting those answers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The facts do not justify the harsh sanction of

default judgment.
Gro justifies its entitlement to a default judgment
because (1) NIMS missed four deadlines to answer the discovery,
(2) NIMS promised these answers for months, and (3) NIMS1 attorney
did not explain the final delay in timely manner.
However, there are valid and justifiable reasons for
these events, not the least of which involved NIMS having to
employ new counsel during that time period.

And these facts do

not approach those normally justifying such a harsh sanction, such
as where an action has been pending for years and a trial has been
set to begin shortly after the missed deadline.
2.

Relief was available to NIMS under Rule 60(b).

NIMS1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was properly
made under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It

was not a second postjudgment motion or otherwise without basis
in the rules.

3
3.

Relief should have been granted to NIMS under Rule 60(b)

There was no need for the trial court to reach the
merits of this action in order to grant NIMS1 Motion to Set Aside
Def ault Judgment.
Even though the trial court has broad discretion, the
facts of this case, including the extreme hardship to NIMS, show
that it was error not to set aside the default judgment of over
$18,000 in the interest of justice.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE FACTS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTION OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Under Point I of its Brief, Gro argued that the trial

court was justified in imposing the harsh sanction of a default
judgment because (1) NIMS missed four deadlines to answer the
discovery, (2) NIMS promised these answers for months, and (3)
NIMS1 attorney did not explain the final delay in timely manner.
With respect to (1) the four deadlines, Gro asserts
that the fact that NIMS changed its attorneys is a red herring,
and that the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, dated
May 1, 1991, is not on appeal.
Addressing the latter point first, that May 1st Order was
clearly interlocutory, and could not be appealed immediately as of
right.

Rather, it was merged into the final Default Judgment and

was appealed unless specifically excluded in the Notice of Appeal,
which it was not.
The Affidavits of Delwin T. Pond, NIMS1 new attorney,
clearly show that the change of attorneys was a very important factor.
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Whereas NIMS1 prior attorney may have known that negotiation?
would prove futile, Mr. Pond was unaware of that.

And he did not

learn of this futility by speaking with Ms. Van Frank on May 10,
1991.

ROA at 82.

She likewise had been preceded by other counsel,

and not until June 3, 1991, after a review of the file, did she
send a letter to Mr. Pond notifying him that her client had previously
and consistently refused to acknowledge any credit for returned
goods.

ROA at 38.

During that interim, Mr. Pond reasonably

delayed incurring the cost of responding to the discovery and
reasonably assured NIMS that the case would be fairly simple
and should settle.

ROA at 82.

In addition, the change of attorneys could well have had
an effect on (2) another promise to answer the discovery.

If

Mr. Pond had been familiar with Mr. Weeks1 schedule and the fact
that he was the only principal of NIMS in a position to supply the
necessary information, his actions and promises would probably
have been different.
As to (3) NIMS1 attorney did not explain the final
delay in timely manner, that lack of a continual volunteered
update does not seem to justify entry of a Default Judgment.

The

explanation was set forth in Mr. Pond's Affidavit in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment, executed about three
weeks after Mr. Pond first realized it would be difficult to get
the information and just when he had succeeded in getting the
information and putting into the proper form.

ROA at 40-41.

Gro's attorney had not contacted Mr. Pond asking about a reason
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for the delay, nor had she indicated that he should be keeping her
posted if there were reasons for a delay.
When the reasons for the delay were supplied, there was
no allowance made by Gro in view of those difficulties.

Rather, a

Supplemental Affidavit of Leslie Van Frank was filed along with a
Request to Submit for Decision.

ROA at 45-47.

If it was important

for NIMS to make Gro aware of difficulties it was experiencing
in responding to discovery, then there should have been some
noticeable effect when NIMS did made Gro aware of those difficulties.
Even if Gro was unwilling to vary from its course of
pursuing a default judgment, the trial court should not have
facilitated that course of action.

This becomes apoarent when

comparing the facts of this case with those where the sanction in
the form of a default judgment for failure to timely respond to
discovery has been upheld.
For example, in the case of Schoney v. Memorial Estates,
Inc., 790 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990), such a sanction was upheld
against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had amended its comolaint

five times. The case had been pending for over six years before
the entry of the judgment.

There had been an order cutting off

discovery, which the Court stated was comparable to an order
compelling discovery.

Finally, the trial was set to begin only a

few weeks after the deadline that had been missed.
Clearly the facts in the instant matter are much different,
and they merit a response much different from the harsh remedy of
a default judgment.
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2.

RELIEF WAS AVAILABLE TO NIMS UNDER RULE 60(B).
In Point II of its Brief, Gro argues that relief under

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is never available
when default judgment is rendered as a sanction for failure to
comply with discovery.
However, the cases cited in that Brief do not support
such a conclusion.
Gro cited the case of Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah
1980).

In that case, defendant made an alternative motion pursuant

to Rule 60(b) to set aside a decree of divorce.

jEd. at 842 n. 2.

Upon plaintiff's motion, defendant's said motion to vacate and set
aside was struck.

Defendant then filed a "Motion for Reconsideration

of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment."
It was this latter motion that did not exist under the rules
according to the case law cited in the decision.
That is, once the costjudgment ruling has been made,
there is no provision for a motion to set aside that ruling.
Nothing in the cases prohibits the initial oostjudgment motion.
This same conclusion results from an analysis of the case
of Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211,
469 P.2d 1 (1970) cited by Gro.
In that case olaintiff was granted summary judgment.
The trial court then denied defendants1 motion to vacate.

So

defendants filed a "Motion to Reconsider the judgment denying the
motion to vacate, and to vacate it."

Ld. at 214.

That latter

motion was the one for which the Court found no basis in the rules.
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On the other hand, Utah case law, including some of the
same cases cited in Gro's Brief, show that this Court may indeed
consider a Rule 60(b) motion under the circumstances of this case,
As indicated in NIMS ' Brief, in the case of Darrington
v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), the issue was whether the
trial court abused its discretion when it set aside the default
judgment it oreviously entered as a discovery sanction.

This

issue and its resolution was summarized as follows:
Because trial courts must deal first hand
with the parties and the discovery orocess,
they are given broad discretion regarding the
imposition of discovery sanctions. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 37(d). They are also vested with
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) to
grant or deny motions to set aside default
judgments. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Consequently, we will interfere with the trial
courtfs decision in this case only if an abuse
of discretion is clearly shown. See Katz
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). We
see no abuse of discretion in this instance
and affirm the trial court's decisions to
vacate the default judgment and, having done
so, not to reinstate it. Id., at 45 7.
Thus the appellant in that case was attacking on aopeal
the trial court's vacating of the default judgment it had obtained
as a discovery sanction.

This action by the trial court in vacating

the judgment was upheld on appeal.

There was no mention of any

inability on the part of the trial court to consider a 60(b)
motion because such a motion in essence asked the trial court to
reconsider its prior order.
The case of Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
950 (Utah App. 1989), cited in Gro's Brief, had a procedural
history which is very informative with respect to this issue

8
raised by Gro.
In that case also a default judgment was entered following
the striking of pleadings as a sanction for failure to comply with
discovery.

The defendant in that case filed two successive sets

of motions, each set including both a Rule 59 motion for a new
trial and a 60(b) motion to set as id**.
Both Rule 59 motions were found to be untimely since
more than 10 days had elapsed.
In addressing the first 60(b) motion, the appellate
court did not say that such a motion was essentially a motion for
reconsideration and as such could not be entertained.

Rather, no

appeal had been perfected and for that reason, the appellate court
did not need to reach the merits.
Finally, we hold that the trial court's order
of June 24, 1987, denying Schettler's 60(b)
motion was a final appealable order, and since
Schettler has not timely appealed that order,
we need not address whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for
relief from final judgment.
Only in addressing the second motion under Rule 60(b)
did the court find a need to impose a rule of finality as argued
by Gro in its said Memorandum.
Furthermore, Schettler's second motion is
clearly barred by "law of the case." "The
purpose of the doctrine of 'the law of the
case' is that in the interest of economy of
time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable
to avoid the delays and the difficulties
involved in reoetitious contentions and ruling
upon the same proposition in the same case."
[Citation.] The doctrine is clearly apolicable
to this case. Both motions were made pursuant
to Rule 60(b) and asserted newly discovered
evidence as grounds for relief.
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It is conceded that the foregoing cases assume and act
as if a Rule 60(b) motion is appropriate rather than specifically
addressing and deciding that issue.

However, a Utah appellate

court has decided that a comparable Rule 59 motion is appropriate.
In the case of Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. Ultrasystems
Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah Apo. 1988) the
court addressed the issue of whether a motion for a new trial
could be made under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
to challenge a summary judgment.

The court found it could.

While acknowledging that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
did not specifically allow such a motion following summary judgment,
the court analyzed the rationale behind the rules and concluded
that such a motion was procedurally correct.
As part of analyzing the rationale, the court drew on
case law from Arizona which showed the advantage and logic of
allowing the trial court, in the first instance, to correct any error.
[T]he Arizona Supreme Court has held that a
summary judgment may be challenged by means of
a motion for new trial and that the timely
filing of such a motion extends the time in
which to appeal. The court has reasoned that
it is unrealistic to hold that the only remedy
left to an unsuccessful litigant after a
summary judgment is to file an appeal. [Citation.]
The languaqe of their procedural rule is
"broad enough to accommodate the policy that a
litigant should be given the opportunity to
persuade the trial court of its error before
proceeding by appeal." _Id. at 127.
This same logic and rationale applies to NIMS' Motion
to Set Aside under Rule 60(b).

It is no more a non-existent

"motion to reconsider" than a motion under Rule 59.

Rather, Rule

10
60(b) also is "broad enough to accommodate the policy that a
litigant should be given the opportunity to persuade the trial
court of its error before proceeding by appeal." Id,
Thereforef NIMS1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
could not properly be denied on the basis of a procedural defect.
3.

RELIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO NIMS UNDER RULE 60(3).
In Point III of its Brief, Gro first argues that the

Rule 60(b) Motion could not have been granted because it dealt with
the merits of the action.

Apparently Gro contends that since the

neglect sought to be found excusable occurred during the course of
discovery, rather than after the filing of its Motion for Entry of
Default, such neglect relates to the merits of the action.
However, the case Gro cites as support, Larsen v. Collina,
684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), does not provide a foundation for that logic.
It is true that Larsen states that usually "it is not
appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions to examine the merits of the
claim decided by the default judgment."

Id., at 55.

But the

procedural history of that case should be reviewed for clarification.
In that case, as in the instant matter, a default judgment
was entered because of defendant's failure to answer interrogatories.
Defendant then filed a motion under Rule 60(b), as in the instant
matter.
After citing the general rule about not examining the
merits, the Larsen Court reviewed the evidence in that paternity
action establishing the defendant as the father.

Thus when the

Court found an exception to the rule against reviewing the merits,
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it did not review the neglect in answering the interrogatories.
Rather, it reviewed the merits of the underlying cause of action.
Likewise in the instant matter, a review of the merits
of the underlying cause of action would involve a review of the
evidence of the alleged debt and the evidence of returns made
offsetting that debt.

Reviewing the merits would not be reviewing

the neglect in answering interrogatories.
Gro then argues in its Brief that NIMS did not show
sufficient grounds for the setting aside of the Default Judqment
imposed as a sanction.

It urges this court to view the case of

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) as controlling on this issue.
However, the Katz case reviews the appropriateness of
setting aside a default judgment entered when there was a failure
to answer, not when such a judgment imposed as a^discovery sanction.
In this case, an effort had already been made in a timely manner
to address the issues in the form of an Answer, and allowance must
be made for that.
Furthermore, the Katz case upheld a Default Judgment in
the sum of $2,686.50, while acknowledging that the trial court had
a duty "to balance the equities," including "the respective hardshios
in denying or granting relief."

Id., at 93 n. 2.

Even if a court should view a Motion to Set Aside a
Default Judgment the same, whether the Default Judgment was entered
due to a failure to file an answer or as a discovery sanction, the
balancing of the equities would have to be different where, as in
the instant matter, the Default Judqment entered was in the much
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greater sum of $18,103.95.

And as near as can be determined from

the recordf that greater judgment amount has resulted in at least
as much greater hardshio on NIMS.
Therefore NIMS1 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment should
have been granted because the requisite willfulness and bad faith
for a discovery sanction were not shown, and the interest of
justice could only have been served by settinq aside the default
judgment of over $18,000 where the merits of the case may well
show that Grofs Complaint should be dismissed, no cause of action.
CONCLUSION
Thus this Court should vacate the Order and Default
Judgment entered below and remand for a continuation of the litigation,
DATED this

/ / ^

day of

^ ^ L

, 1992.

LYNN P. HEWARD & DEL WIN T. POND
Attorneys for Defendant and Aopellant

By

~~*=^^^,^^^
LYNN P. HEWARD
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Roger G. Segal (Bar No. 2908)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GRO ENTERPRISES, INC., dba
CHICAGO BARTER CORP.,
PLAINTIFF' S FIRST REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 90-0906404-CN
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING
SERVICES, INC. , a Utah
corporation,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.
Plaintiff requests the Defendant, pursuant' to Rule 34, Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

to produce

at the

office

of

their

counsel, within thirty days after service of this request, the
documents
custody

hereinafter

or control

designated

that

are

in

of said defendant including

agents and attorneys

the

possession,

its employees,

and, upon such production, to permit the

inspection and copying of such documents.

DEFINITIONS
1.

As used herein, "document" includes any written, printed,

typed, recorded or graphic matter, however produced or reproduced,
now in the possession, custody or control of the plaintiff, its

present

and former

employees, and all other persons

acting or

purporting to act on behalf of defendant.
2.

As

used

herein,

"you"

or "your"

means

the defendant

producing the documents requested herein, and all other persons
acting or purporting to act on behalf of the defendant.

REQUESTS
REQUEST NO,

1.

Produce all documents identified in your

answers to the Interrogatories served herewith.
DATED this

"}>A

day of January, 1991.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

Roger G. Segal
Leslie Van Frank
Attorneys for defendant
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document was mailed this

<:\A

day of January, 1991, in the United

States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following;
Terry C. Turner
Attorney for defendant
5505 South 900 East
Suite 220
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 7 . .
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